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A SHOCKING LOSS OF INVESTOR 
PROTECTION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the enactment of federal securities laws in the 1930s, securities 
markets around the world have become more interconnected than anyone 
could have imagined at that time.1 The antifraud provisions of the U.S. 
securities laws are silent as to their extraterritorial application, however, and 
as international securities transactions became commonplace, courts were 
forced to address the question of whether these provisions applied to 
transactions involving foreign parties or foreign-traded stock.2 For decades, 
in dealing with this issue, the courts sought to balance the protection of 
investors and markets with respect for the sovereignty of other nations. 
Recently, the Supreme Court, for the first time, addressed the issue of the 
extraterritoriality of U.S. antifraud provisions in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank.3 In this landmark case, the Court overturned nearly forty 
years of precedent4 and stripped the protection of American antifraud laws 
from Americans investing abroad. As a result, if such investors suffer losses 
due to securities fraud, they now have no choice but to seek redress under 
the laws and procedures of foreign jurisdictions. 
This note will examine some of the securities class action laws and 
procedures of other countries and discuss whether, as a result of Morrison, 
American investors transacting abroad are left without sufficient protection 
against foreign securities fraud. Part I of this note provides background as 
to how the courts dealt with the question of the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. securities laws prior to Morrison. Part II presents the facts and 
procedural history of Morrison. Additionally, it sets out the new test 
articulated by the Supreme Court, and its implications, including forcing 
Americans investing abroad to seek redress for securities fraud in foreign 
jurisdictions. Part III examines some of the securities class action 
procedures found in other countries and how they provide insufficient 
                                                                                                                                          
 1. See Daniel S. Kahn, The Collapsing Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Antifraud Provisions 
of the U.S. Securities Laws: The Supreme Court and Congress Ready to Redress Forty Years of 
Ambiguity, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 365, 369–70 (2010) (“[T]he Congress that enacted the securities 
laws could not have anticipated the future globalization of the American economy. . . . The web of 
international connections in the securities market was then not nearly as extensive or complex as it 
has become.”). 
 2. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). See also Hannah 
L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing 
Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 18–19 (2007) (“[T]he anti-fraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws do not speak directly to the scope of their application in 
the international context.”). 
 3. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 4. See id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the Court should have adhered to “the 
general approach that has been the law in the Second Circuit, and most of the rest of the country, 
for nearly four decades”). 
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protection for American investors. Finally, in Part IV, I argue that Congress 
should, in furtherance of the goals of U.S. securities laws, legislate to 
mitigate the effects of Morrison, and I offer a legislative proposal to better 
protect American investors and deter foreign securities fraud. 
I. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS PRE-
MORRISON 
Over the past forty years, U.S. courts struggled to determine whether 
the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws applied to securities 
transactions involving foreign issuers or foreign-traded stock.5 This is due 
to the fact that the prevailing antifraud measure regulating secondary 
markets, § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange 
Act), is silent as to the extraterritorial application of the law.6 As a result, 
courts were forced to create and apply their own tests, which focused on 
“whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of the United 
States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted” to a securities 
fraud claim with extraterritorial elements.7 Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Morrison, the lower federal courts framed the issue as one of 
subject matter jurisdiction: U.S. courts could potentially have subject matter 
jurisdiction over claims with extraterritorial elements if the claim was based 
on conduct taking place in the United States, or on effects felt within the 
United States.8 
A. THE CONDUCT TEST 
Under what was aptly named the “conduct” test, U.S. courts exercised 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial securities fraud actions if enough fraudulent 
                                                                                                                                          
 5. See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities 
Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (2009) (“[M]uch uncertainty surrounds the 
consideration of extraterritorial issues within securities class-action lawsuits. The individual 
doctrines applied within the courts—such as the conduct and effects tests—are often ambiguous 
and difficult to predict.”). 
 6. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act reads:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). It follows that, since Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under § 10(b), they have the 
same scope. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) (“Liability under Rule 10b-5 
. . . does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition.”). 
 7. Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 
(2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 
 8. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 18–20. 
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conduct occurred within the United States.9 Under the standard applied by 
the Second Circuit,10 to assert jurisdiction, the domestic conduct must have 
“directly caused” the loss to plaintiffs and must have been more than 
“merely preparatory” to the fraud that occurred abroad.11 An additional 
consideration was whether exercising jurisdiction over a particular 
extraterritorial dispute would discourage fraudulent actors from using the 
United States to defraud investors.12 Courts reasoned that expanding the 
reach of U.S. securities laws and actively policing global markets would 
deter international securities fraud and encourage other countries to 
implement and enforce their own securities fraud laws in cross-border 
transactions.13 
B. THE EFFECTS TEST 
The “effects” test, which has been applied both alone and in 
conjunction with the “conduct” test,14 was first articulated in Schoenbaum v. 
Firstbrook.15 The test focused on whether the fraudulent activity that 
occurred overseas had a substantial effect on U.S. markets or citizens.16 The 
                                                                                                                                          
 9. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986–87 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 10. The Second Circuit’s standard:  
[E]stablished that application of § 10(b) could be premised upon either some effect on 
American securities markets or investors (Schoenbaum) or significant conduct in the 
United States (Leasco). It later formalized these two applications into (1) an “effects 
test,” “whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or 
upon United States citizens,” and (2) a “conduct test,” “whether the wrongful conduct 
occurred in the United States.” 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010). 
 11. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] federal court has subject matter 
jurisdiction if the defendant’s conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory to 
the fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act within the United States directly caused 
losses to foreign investors abroad.”). 
 12. See Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d at 125 (reasoning that “Congress would not want 
the United States to become a base for fraudulent activity harming foreign investors”). See also 
SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that, from a policy perspective, 
jurisdiction should be asserted because Congress did not “intend[] to allow the United States to 
become a ‘Barbary Coast,’ . . . harboring international securities ‘pirates’”). 
 13. See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for 
the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 99–100 (2003). See also Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 (“By finding jurisdiction 
here, we may encourage other nations to take appropriate steps against parties who seek to 
perpetrate fraud in the United States.”). 
 14. The Second Circuit generally applies both the “conduct” and the “effects” tests together. 
See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]n admixture or combination 
of the two [tests] often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States 
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court.”). 
 15. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 16. See id. at 206 (“We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have 
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign 
securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of 
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policy behind this approach was one of American self-interest: American 
investors should be protected even if the fraud affecting them occurred 
abroad.17 Yet, claims of reducing investor confidence or of a general 
detrimental effect on the U.S. economy were later held to be insufficient to 
establish jurisdiction.18 Plaintiffs were required to show that a specific U.S. 
interest was adversely affected by the foreign conduct.19 
C. THE END OF THE LINE FOR THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS TESTS 
While the “conduct” and “effects” tests were originally articulated in 
decisions by the Second Circuit, other circuit courts adopted different 
standards as to the nature and amount of domestic activity required in order 
to find subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign transaction.20 As a result, 
several commentators criticized these tests as ambiguous,21 inconsistent,22 
and unpredictable,23 and called for clearer, stricter standards in determining 
                                                                                                                                          
improper foreign transactions in American securities.”). See also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank 
Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 17. See Schoebaum, 405 F.2d at 208 (stating that subject matter jurisdiction should be 
exercised over transactions that take place outside the United States, which “are detrimental to the 
interests of American investors”). 
 18. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that 
jurisdiction did not exist where there was only “an adverse effect on this country’s general 
economic interests or on American security prices”). See also Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 22 
(stating that plaintiffs “must show detrimental effect on specific interests within the United 
States,” as courts “have consistently rejected arguments that U.S. securities law reaches foreign 
conduct simply because that conduct affects general confidence in the U.S. securities markets”). 
 19. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989. 
 20. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 25 (“Over the years, the different circuits have developed 
competing standards for evaluating the kind or quantity of local conduct that is necessary to create 
jurisdiction over predominantly foreign transactions.”). The Fifth and Seventh Circuits adopted 
approaches similar to that of the Second Circuit. See Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc’ns 
Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906–07 (5th Cir. 1997); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 
(7th Cir. 1998). The D.C. Circuit took a stricter interpretation and required that the domestic 
conduct itself be an independent violation of U.S. securities laws. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson 
& Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30–33 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On the other hand, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits adopted a broad approach, which required that the domestic conduct be in furtherance of 
the alleged fraud. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977); Continental Grain (Austl.) 
Pty. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 
F.2d 421, 424–25 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 21. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 5, at 467 (“[M]uch uncertainty surrounds the 
consideration of extraterritorial issues within securities class-action lawsuits. The individual 
doctrines applied within the courts—such as the conduct and effects tests—are often ambiguous 
and difficult to predict.”). 
 22. See Chang, supra note 13, at 96 (“[C]ourts do not apply the conduct test with the same 
degree of uniformity.”); Michael J. Kaufman, Supreme Court’s Test in Morrison for 
Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5 to Foreign Cubed Cases, in 26 SEC. LITIG.: DAMAGES 
§ 10:2.50 (2011) (“[F]ederal circuits that confronted the question [of whether there is subject 
matter jurisdiction under the conducts test] came up with a number of different approaches.”). 
 23. See Robert L. Hickok & Daniel J. Boland, Do Antifraud Provisions of U.S. Securities Laws 
Apply to Foreign Actions?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp 
/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202437129880&slreturn=1 (“There is a split among the circuit courts 
regarding the proper interpretation of the conduct test, potentially resulting in different outcomes 
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whether there was jurisdiction over extraterritorial securities claims.24 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court surprised many25 with its decision in 
Morrison by rejecting and replacing the “conduct” and “effects” tests.26 
II. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 
National Australia Bank (NAB), located and incorporated in Australia, 
has “ordinary shares,” 27 which trade on the Australian Securities Exchange 
and other foreign exchanges.28 American Depository Receipts (ADRs)29 of 
NAB trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).30 In 1998, NAB 
purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), an American mortgage 
service provider located in Florida.31 In 2001, NAB incurred multiple write-
downs totaling nearly $2.25 billion as a result of faulty valuation models 
related to valuing HomeSide’s assets.32 NAB’s share price fell sharply upon 
these disclosures and several foreign individuals who owned NAB shares 
(the Plaintiffs),33 brought suit in the Southern District of New York against 
NAB, HomeSide, and several officers of both companies (collectively, the 
Defendants).34 The Plaintiffs alleged that, with the knowledge of NAB and 
its officers, HomeSide misrepresented financial models to inflate the value 
of the company’s assets, and, as a result, NAB “made materially false and 
misleading statements in SEC filings, annual reports and press releases 
regarding HomeSide’s profitability, economic health and its contribution to 
NAB,” in violation of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and 
                                                                                                                                          
on similar fact patterns.”); Chang, supra note 13, at 117 (“The aggressive and inconsistent judicial 
response to transnational securities fraud has not ensured predictability in the application of 
antifraud rules.”). 
 24. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 5, at 468; Chang, supra note 13, at 118–21; Kahn, supra 
note 1, at 411–12.  
 25. Sarah L. Cave, F-Cubed=0: Supreme Court’s Decision in ‘Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank,’ N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2010, at 4 (noting that the Court’s opinion was “a more far-reaching 
ruling than many anticipated”). 
 26. Kaufman, supra note 22 (“[T]he Supreme Court explicitly rejected the ‘conduct and 
effects’ test articulated by the Second Circuit.”). 
 27. “Ordinary shares” are the “equivalent of American common stock.” Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 28. Id.  
 29. ADRs represent “one or more shares of foreign stock or a fraction of a share” and give the 
holders the “right to obtain the foreign stock [they] represent[].” American Depository Receipts, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
 30. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 168. 
 31. Id. at 168–69.  
 32. Id. at 169.  
 33. The initial plaintiffs consisted of both foreign plaintiffs (residents of Australia) who owned 
NAB ordinary shares, as well as a domestic plaintiff, who owned ADRs trading on the NYSE. The 
domestic plaintiff’s claims were dismissed in the district court for failing to allege damages and 
were not appealed. Thus, the Second Circuit and Supreme Court decisions focused solely on the 
claims of the foreign plaintiffs. Id. at 170 n.3.  
 34. Id. at 169.  
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5.35 Actions such as 
this one, where foreign plaintiffs bring a claim against a foreign issuer over 
a foreign securities transaction, are referred to as “foreign-cubed” or “f-
cubed” litigation.36 The District Court for the Southern District of New 
York applied the Second Circuit’s “conduct” and “effects” tests,37 and 
granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.38 
On appeal, the Plaintiffs argued that U.S. securities laws were 
applicable to their claim by virtue of the conduct test because the fraudulent 
activity occurred at HomeSide, which was located in the United States.39 
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, however, and 
in utilizing the “conduct” and “effects” tests, concluded that jurisdiction 
could not be asserted over the case for three main reasons: (1) NAB’s 
actions were “more central to the fraud” than the manipulation of numbers 
by HomeSide in Florida;40 (2) the Plaintiffs did not allege any effect on 
American markets or investors;41 and (3) there was a “lengthy chain of 
causation” between the fraudulent domestic conduct and the harm to the 
Plaintiffs.42 The Second Circuit also specifically rejected the adoption of a 
bright-line rule that subject matter jurisdiction could never be established 
over “foreign-cubed” securities actions based on the presumption against 
the extraterritorial application of congressional statutes.43 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                                          
 35. Id.  
 36. See Nicolas Grabar, Second Circuit Limits Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities 
Laws in Benchmark “Foreign-Cubed” Class Action Decision, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
AND THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2009: STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 781 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Ser. No. 18228) (2009) 
(defining a “foreign-cubed” action as “a suit by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign issuer based on 
securities transactions in a foreign country”); James F. Moyle & Steven L. Penaro, Foreign Bank 
Issuer. Foreign Plaintiff. Foreign Transaction. Class Action Exposure in the U.S. Under Federal 
Securities Laws? 127 BANKING L.J. 458, 459 (2010) (explaining that “‘f-cubed’ cases involve (1) 
a foreign purchaser; (2) suing a foreign issuer for violations of U.S. securities laws; (3) with 
respect to securities transactions in foreign countries”).  
 37. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, federal courts (erroneously) framed the 
question of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws as one of subject matter jurisdiction. 
See supra Part I. 
 38. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03-6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *11–20 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction because the predominant 
fraudulent conduct occurred in Australia, rather than in the United States, and the alleged fraud 
had essentially no effect on the U.S. market). 
 39. See Morrison, 547 F.3d at 175. 
 40. Id. at 176.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 176–77.  
 43. See id. at 174–75.  
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Court granted certiorari44 and in its decision, focused precisely on the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of American laws.45 
A. THE NEW (AND UNANTICIPATED) “TRANSACTIONAL” TEST 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit, but at 
the same time, rejected and replaced the familiar “conduct and effects” 
analysis utilized by federal courts for forty years.46 First, the Court 
corrected an error made by lower courts with regard to the threshold issue 
of the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, saying that it is 
not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, but one on the merits of the 
case.47 The Court then invoked a longstanding principle of statutory 
interpretation that unless a contrary intent appears, a congressional statute is 
meant only to apply within the United States.48 As such, the Court 
concluded that § 10(b) does not apply outside the United States because 
“there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies 
extraterritorially.”49 The Court then declared that, since the language of the 
Exchange Act focuses on the securities transaction in question and not on 
where the relevant deceptive conduct occurred,50 § 10(b) applies only to 
“transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic 
transactions in other securities.”51 Since NAB’s securities were not listed on 
a U.S. exchange and the relevant transactions did not take place in the 
United States, the Court found that § 10(b) did not reach the alleged fraud 
                                                                                                                                          
 44. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 783 (2009), cert. granted, 175 L.Ed.2d 513 
(U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1191). 
 45. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–83 (2010) (criticizing the lower 
federal courts for disregarding the longstanding presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. laws). See also infra Part II.A. 
 46. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Kahn, supra note 1, at 
404 (noting that it has “been more than forty years since the decisions in Schoenbaum and Leasco 
first applied the conduct and effects tests to determine the jurisdictional reach of the antifraud 
provisions”). 
 47. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (majority opinion) (“[T]o ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is 
to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by 
contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s ‘power to hear a case.’’ . . . It presents an issue quite separate from 
the question whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 48. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating that it is a “longstanding 
principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant 
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’”) (citations omitted). 
 49. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
 50. Id. at 2884 (“[T]he focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception 
originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Section 10(b) does not 
punish deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.’”) 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)). 
 51. Id.  
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and dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.52 This new 
“transactional” test53 overturned nearly forty years of precedential law 
related to transnational securities fraud in the Second Circuit and in much 
of the rest of the country.54 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN 
MORRISON 
While the Plaintiffs in Morrison struck out under the “conduct” and 
“effects” tests and the “transactional” test,55 many other investors who 
previously would have had a claim under U.S. securities laws, no longer 
have a cause of action.56 This is the case because the decision reaches 
beyond just “foreign-cubed” actions.57 In fact, “foreign-cubed” cases appear 
to be fairly uncommon, as evidenced by the Second Circuit’s statement that 
Morrison was “the first so-called ‘foreign-cubed’ securities class action to 
reach th[e] Circuit.”58 The implications of the new “transactional” test 
articulated by the Court are far broader than affecting just “foreign-cubed” 
litigation.59 In fact, the rights of all American investors who purchase 
securities abroad are profoundly affected by this decision.60 Less certain is 
                                                                                                                                          
 52. Id. at 2888 (“This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all 
aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners who still have live claims occurred 
outside the United States. Petitioners have therefore failed to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted.”).  
 53. See id. at 2886.  
 54. See id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost:  
§ 10(B) After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343, 356 (2011) (noting 
that the conduct and effects tests were used by the Second Circuit “[f]or the better part of four 
decades”). 
 55. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (finding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief 
under the “transactional” test as § 10(b) does not reach the alleged fraud); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction under the 
“conduct” and “effects” tests). 
 56. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 57. Ted Farris, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Implications of Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd. (June 28, 2010), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_corporate_morrisonvnationalbank_062510 
/#page=1 (“[T]he rule announced in National Australia Bank has far broader application than . . . 
‘foreign-cubed’ cases . . . [and is a] broadly stated holding.”). 
 58. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 172. Most securities class actions are brought in the Second Circuit. 
See Securities Class Action Filings—2009: A Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 25 
(2010), http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2009_YIR/Cornerstone_Research 
_Filings_2009_YIR.pdf. Additionally, as noted in the concurring opinion in Morrison, “foreign-
cubed” cases “would fail the Second Circuit’s test” anyway, “as they generally should.” Morrison, 
130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 59. See Theodore J. Sawicki & Todd Chatham, Foreign Cubed Cases: The Supreme Court 
Contains a Potential Flood in Securities Litigation, in 27 SEC. LITIG: FORMS AND ANALYSIS  
§ 1:10 (2011) (“[B]ecause Morrison turns on a transactions test, the decision will have impacts 
that extend beyond foreign cubed cases.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Hath ‘Morrison’ Wrought?, 
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 2010, at 5 (“Morrison affects much more than the ‘f-cubed’ class action.”). 
 60. Coffee, supra note 59 (“Morrison . . . will by its terms bar even private actions by 
American investors who purchase the securities of American issuers on a foreign exchange.”). 
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whether Morrison also limits the power of the SEC to bring enforcement 
actions against foreign companies.61 
1. Bright-Line Rule Against Americans Investing Abroad 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison is a bright-line rule barring 
any American investor who purchases securities trading only on a foreign 
exchange from bringing suit under U.S. securities laws.62 As a result, 
American plaintiffs who purchase securities abroad, who once had a chance 
to be heard in U.S. courts under the “conduct” or “effects” tests, will now 
not even be able to get their foot in the door to be heard. This concern is 
reflected in the concurring opinion to the Morrison decision63: 
Imagine . . . an American investor who buys shares in a company listed 
only on an overseas exchange. That company has a major American 
subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it was in New 
York City that the executives masterminded and implemented a massive 
deception which artificially inflated the stock price—and which will, upon 
its disclosure, cause the price to plummet . . . [The] investors would, under 
the Court’s new test, be barred from seeking relief under § 10(b).64 
In this scenario, where there is both wrongful conduct in the United 
States and injury to U.S. markets and citizens, § 10(b) no longer applies.65 
Plaintiffs in analogous circumstances were previously able to bring a claim 
under U.S. securities laws. For example, the American plaintiffs in Leasco 
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, were fraudulently induced to 
buy stock in a British company, which did not trade domestically.66 The 
plaintiffs were able to bring suit in the United States under the “conduct” 
                                                                                                                                          
 61. The concurrence in Morrison states that the Court’s decision leaves the SEC’s enforcement 
power unaffected. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 n.12. However, the Court did not distinguish 
between private plaintiffs and the SEC in its holding. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59. 
 62. See Farris, supra note 57 (observing that the new test will likely “disallow Rule 10b-5 
claims by a US plaintiff purchasing securities abroad of any issuer whether domestic or foreign 
where the securities are not listed in the United States”). See also Adam Johnson, Jonathan Cary 
& Alex Bafi, Foreign-cubed Securities Actions: The End of the Line?, PRAC. L. CO. (July 28, 
2010), http://finance.practicallaw.com/5-502-8826 (stating that the transactional test “limits the 
ability of US plaintiffs to bring actions under the anti-fraud provisions of the . . . [Exchange Act] 
in circumstances where they acquire non-US listed securities and the transactions take place 
outside the US”). 
 63. Supreme Court Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment but disagreed 
with the reasoning of the Court. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“While I 
agree that petitioners have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted, my reasoning 
differs from the Court’s.”). 
 64. Id. at 2895.  
 65. See Glen Devalerio & Jeffrey C. Block, High Court Thumbs Nose at Investors, PENSIONS 
& INVESTMENTS ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.pionline.com/article/20101101/PRINTSUB 
/311019999 (“[T]he high court wiped out four decades of judicial precedent, severely limiting 
investors’ ability to hold multinational companies accountable for their misdeeds—even those that 
take place in the United States or hurt U.S. investors.”). 
 66. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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test because of deceptive acts that took place in the United States.67 The 
court in Leasco emphasized the importance of protecting American 
investors.68 Under the “transactional” test, however, such plaintiffs are now 
completely barred from bringing a securities fraud case in U.S. courts.69 
2. Application of the “Transactional” Test Since Morrison 
The test articulated in Morrison is being applied broadly by district 
courts70 and has already barred many American investors from pursuing 
securities fraud class actions in the United States.71 In one of the first 
securities fraud actions faced by a district court after Morrison, a judge in 
the Southern District of New York held that, in light of Morrison, the 
claims of American plaintiffs who purchased shares of Credit Suisse on the 
Swiss stock exchange were barred.72 Citing Morrison, the court held that  
§ 10(b) does “not apply to transactions involving (1) a purchase or sale, 
wherever it occurs, of securities listed only on a foreign exchange, or (2) a 
purchase or sale of securities, foreign or domestic, which occurs outside the 
United States.”73 
Since then, plaintiffs’ attorneys have made several creative arguments 
in an attempt to circumvent the holding in Morrison, but have been 
unsuccessful.74 In a securities fraud class action led by an American pension 
fund against Swiss Reinsurance Co.,75 plaintiffs argued that their purchases 
were actually made in the United States because the buy orders were placed 
in the United States.76 The court rejected this argument and held that “a 
purchase order in the United States for a security that is sold on a foreign 
exchange is insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act” and dismissed the case.77 Similarly, a $2 billion 
                                                                                                                                          
 67. Id. at 1334–35.  
 68. See id. at 1337.  
 69. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (rejecting the “conduct” and “effects” test and limiting 
the application of U.S. securities laws to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, 
and domestic transactions in other securities”). 
 70. Fred T. Isquith, Interpreting Morrison v. National Australia Bank, LAW 360 (Nov. 3, 2010, 
10:58 AM), http://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/206320. 
 71. See generally Nathan Koppel & Ashby Jones, Securities Ruling Limits Claims of Fraud, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487036942045755183 
01351548676.html; Luke Green, Securities Class Actions Post Q1 2011: Around the Horn, ISS 
GOVERNANCE SECURITIES LITIGATION WATCH BLOG (Apr. 18, 2011, 12:29 PM), 
http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2011/04/securities-class-actions-post-q1-2011-around-the-horn 
.html; Isquith, supra note 70. 
 72. See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 73. Id. at 623–24.  
 74. Isquith, supra note 70. 
 75. Shares of Swiss Reinsurance Co. are only listed on a Swiss stock exchange. Plumbers’ 
Union Local No. 12 v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 76. Id. at 177.  
 77. See id. at 178. In addition to finding that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act did not apply, the 
court also held that the plaintiff failed to allege fraud with the necessary particularity. See id. See 
also Patricia Hurtado, Swiss Re Wins Dismissal of Credit Default Swaps Suit, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 
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securities fraud lawsuit brought by several hedge funds against Porsche, 
whose stock trades in Germany, was dismissed despite plaintiffs’ argument 
that they used swap agreements that were transacted in the United States, 
rather than trading in the underlying security.78 In another case against 
UBS, plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed where UBS common shares traded 
both on the NYSE and a foreign exchange.79 Despite this, the court held that 
only the claims based on shares actually trading in the United States could 
proceed, thus wiping out almost 90 percent of potential damages.80 In an 
action against Alstom SA (Alstom),81 plaintiffs argued that since the 
company had ADRs listed on a U.S. exchange, the securities purchased on a 
French stock exchange should also be covered by § 10(b) for American 
investors.82 This argument was rejected as well, with the court emphasizing 
that under the “transactional” test, the “focus [is] on where the transaction 
actually occurs,” not whether the company’s securities are also listed on a 
U.S. exchange.83 The claims of Alstom ADR purchasers were not affected 




 78. Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(“Plaintiffs’ swaps were the functional equivalent of trading the underlying VW shares on a 
German exchange. . . . Plaintiffs’ swap agreements are essentially ‘transactions conducted upon 
foreign exchanges and markets,’ and not ‘domestic transactions’ that merit the protection of  
§ 10(b).”). 
 79. See In re UBS Sec. Litig., No. 07-11225, 2011 WL 4059356, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2011); Alison Frankel, Investors Lose Last, Best Chance to Stem Morrison Bloodbath, THOMPSON 
REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Sept. 14, 2011, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal 
/News/2011/09_-_September/Investors_lose_last,_best_chance_to_stem_Morrison_bloodbath 
(“About 12 percent of UBS shares are listed in the United States,” thus, “an investor could buy a 
share of UBS on the Swiss exchange in the morning and trade it on the NYSE in the afternoon.”). 
 80. Frankel, supra note 79. 
 81. Plaintiffs included American investors who purchased Alstom stock on a French stock 
exchange as well as ADRs on the NYSE. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 
471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 82. See id. at 471–72; Isquith, supra note 70. 
 83. See In re Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 472. A similar conclusion was reached in an action 
against Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), where the court dismissed the claims of plaintiffs who 
purchased RBS ordinary shares trading on foreign exchanges, despite plaintiffs’ argument that 
RBS ADRs were listed on the NYSE. In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. 
Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The idea that a foreign company is subject to U.S. Securities 
laws everywhere it conducts foreign transactions merely because it has ‘listed’ some securities in 
the United States is simply contrary to the spirit of Morrison.”). 
 84. Isquith, supra note 70 (noting that the claims of ADR purchasers were not dismissed). 
Similarly, in a decision appointing lead plaintiff in a securities class action against Toyota, the 
court noted that the claims of purchasers of Toyota’s stock, which trades on the Tokyo stock 
exchange, would likely be dismissed, while the claims of ADR purchasers would remain. As a 
result, however, recoverable losses of the lead plaintiff shrunk from nearly $17 million to around 
$250,000. See Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 10-0922, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1–3 (C.D. 
Cal. July 16, 2010); Dorothy Heyl, Federal Courts Apply ‘Morrison’ Expansively, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 
19, 2010, at 4. 
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Since the decision in Alstom, however, ADR purchasers have been 
added to the list of those investors excluded from U.S. courts.85 In a 
securities fraud class action against Société Générale (SocGen), the court 
dismissed not only the claims of U.S. investors who had purchased SocGen 
stock on a foreign exchange, but also the claims of U.S. investors who 
purchased ADRs over the counter in the United States.86 Further narrowing 
the rights of American investors, the court stated that § 10(b) was not 
applicable since the SocGen ADRs were not listed on an “official American 
securities exchange” and trades in ADRs are considered to be a 
“predominantly foreign securities transaction.”87 There is some 
inconsistency among the district courts on this issue, however. In a 
subsequent securities fraud action, the court, without explaining its 
reasoning, declined to dismiss the claims of plaintiffs who purchased ADRs 
on a U.S. exchange.88 Despite this, many courts appear to be interpreting 
the holding in Morrison expansively,89 substantially limiting the ability of 
American investors to seek redress for losses due to securities fraud.90 
3. Morrison is Harmful Policy and Could Leave American 
Investors Unprotected 
The expansive application of Morrison essentially incentivizes 
companies to ensure that transactions in their securities occur outside of the 
United States in order to avoid securities fraud liability: “[A]nyone selling 
complex financial instruments should just insist that buyers complete the 
transactions out of the borders of the United States. That way, no matter 
how badly sellers misrepresent the securities, they’re protected by the 
impermeable heat shield the U.S. Supreme Court erected in Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank.”91 Indeed, as noted earlier, foreign companies 
                                                                                                                                          
 85. See BNA Sec. Law Daily, Morrison Ripples Bar Investors’ Suit; SocGen Investors Cannot 
Use U.S. Courts (Oct. 5, 2010). 
 86. The court acted sua sponte in dismissing the claims related to the ADRs, as SocGen had 
only moved to dismiss against the purchasers of the foreign exchange traded stock. See In re 
Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08-2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 
2010); Daniel Snare, Expanding Morrison to Bar 10(b) Claims for ADR Transactions Made on the 
OTC, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Nov. 15, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom 
.org/securities-issues/2010/11/15/expanding-morrison-to-bar-10b-claims-for-adr-transactions-ma 
.html. 
 87. Société Générale Sec. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, at *7–11 (citations omitted). 
 88. Kleinman v. Elan Corp. (In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig.), No. 08-8761 (AKH), 2011 WL 
1442328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2011). It is unclear if trading ADRs on an official exchange, as 
opposed to an over-the-counter market, was relevant to the court’s decision. 
 89. See Heyl, supra note 84. 
 90. See Koppel & Jones, supra note 71 (“Judges have been interpreting the ruling in Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank Ltd. as preventing fraud claims in U.S. courts by any investor–either 
from the U.S. or abroad–who purchased shares on foreign exchange.”). 
 91. Alison Frankel, Morrison Strikes Again! Goldman Get $1 Bl Fraud Case Tossed, 
THOMPSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, July 21, 2011, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com 
/Legal/News/2011/07_-_July/Morrison_strikes_again!_Goldman_get_$1_bl_fraud_case_tossed/. 
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have already benefitted under the “transactional” test and will likely 
continue to do so as more companies avoid listing or effecting securities 
transactions in the United States.92  
The legacy of Morrison is a shocking loss of protection for American 
investors, as investment overseas is not uncommon. Indeed, in 2007, about 
36 percent of investing Americans owned foreign stocks.93 Many domestic 
investors are mutual funds and pension plans, which invest in multinational 
companies and buy stock overseas in order to access more liquidity than 
they would by purchasing ADRs of foreign companies on a domestic 
exchange.94 BP is an example of a foreign company that stands to save 
billions, at the expense of American investors, as a result of the Court’s 
decision.95 A few American pension and retirement funds purportedly 
suffered $200 million in BP stock losses because BP misled investors about 
their safety precautions related to drilling.96 The decision in Morrison 
shrinks the recoverable losses in U.S. court by more than $175 million once 
the losses on stock purchased abroad are stripped out.97 Morrison also takes 
aim at investors who prevailed in a jury trial in January 2010 when jurors 
found that Vivendi was liable for fifty-seven misstatements to 
shareholders.98 A post-trial decision amended the class certification to 
exclude purchasers of ordinary shares of Vivendi abroad and may reduce 
potential damages of nearly $9 billion by as much as 80 percent.99 At a time 
when American investors have suffered severe financial losses due to 
widespread corporate mishandling and a worldwide economic downturn, 
                                                                                                                                          
 92. Farris, supra note 57. Morrison gives  
issuers and underwriters a bright line test they can potentially use to avoid Rule 10b-5 
liability in international securities transactions. For example, foreign issuers selling non 
US listed securities to US institutions may insist that those purchasers buy their 
securities in an offshore transaction by a non US affiliate in an effort to remain beyond 
the reach of Rule 10b-5.  
Id.  
 93. Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Divided as to Effect of Foreign Investing on U.S. Economy, 
GALLUP (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/26905/public-divided-effect-foreign-
investing-us-economy.aspx. 
 94. Koppel & Jones, supra note 71. 
 95. See Greg Stohr, BP, Vivendi Among Companies that may Save Billions from Ruling, 
BLOOMBERG, June 28, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/bp-vivendi-among-
companies-that-may-save-billions-after-high-court-ruling.html. 
 96. Koppel & Jones, supra note 71. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See Jennifer Thompson, Vivendi in US Legal Victory Against Investors, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 
23, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/193a6300-3f5f-11e0-8e48-00144feabdc0.html 
#axzz1Y2oFuFRe. 
 99. Id.; Chad Bray, Vivendi Fraud Claims Ruled Limited to ADR Holders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704071304576160864164657034 
.html. 
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Morrison essentially “gives foreign companies diplomatic immunity when 
it comes to charges of securities fraud.”100 
C. LIMITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT POWER OF THE 
SEC 
Although Morrison involved a private right of action, since § 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, are also used by 
the SEC to bring enforcement actions,101 the decision in Morrison may 
affect the ability of the SEC to pursue claims against foreign companies on 
behalf of investors.102 There is ambiguity, however, as to whether the 
Court’s decision limits the SEC’s authority because even though the 
decision did not specifically address the government enforcement of  
§ 10(b),103 neither did it expressly protect the SEC’s authority to bring 
extraterritorial actions under § 10(b).104 While the concurring opinion in 
Morrison noted that the majority’s opinion did not prevent the SEC from 
bringing enforcement actions against foreign companies,105 several 
commentators believe otherwise.106 
                                                                                                                                          
 100. Steve W. Berman, Misguided Supreme Court Decision Gives Foreign Companies 
Diplomatic Immunity, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 12, 2010, 2:54 PM), http://blog 
.seattlepi.com/steveberman/archives/224511.asp. 
 101. See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 67 
(2009). 
 102. See Advisory, Stewart D. Aaron et al, Arnold & Porter LLP, US Supreme Court Limits 
Extraterritorial Reach of the US Securities Laws; Congress Acts (July 2010), 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory-US_Supreme_Court_Limits_Extra 
territorial_Reach_of_the_US_Securities_Laws_062810.pdf (noting that “because Section 10(b) is 
also utilized by the SEC as an anti-fraud enforcement mechanism, the Opinion raises significant 
questions as to the SEC’s authority to pursue companies under Section 10(b) that are not 
registered on US exchanges”). 
 103. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59 (“Morrison does not limit its holding to private 
plaintiffs. It makes no distinction as to the limits imposed in this context on private plaintiffs and 
on the SEC.”). Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 n.12 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the opinion does not affect the SEC’s enforcement power). 
 104. See Luke Green, Morrison v. National Australia Bank – The Dawn of a New Age?, 
ISS:SEC. LITIG. (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2010/06/morrison-
v-national-australia-bank---the-dawn-of-a-new-age.html (“The opinion does not carve out an 
exception for the extraterritorial reach of SEC . . . actions. Thus, it could be construed to place the 
same limitations on these agencies as it does on private claimants.”). The SEC, in its amicus brief, 
urged the Supreme Court to adopt separate tests of extraterritoriality for private plaintiffs and SEC 
enforcement actions. This request was denied. See Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, 
Applicability to SEC of Private Action Requirements in § 10(b) Cases, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11, 2010, at 
3. 
 105. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion does not, 
however, foreclose the [SEC] from bringing enforcement actions in additional circumstances, as 
no issue concerning the [SEC’s] authority is presented by this case.”). 
 106. See Allens Arthur Robinson, Focus: US Courts’ Extraterritorial Reach in Securities Fraud 
Cases Reinstated (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/ldr/focsraug10.htm (stating that the 
transactional test “applie[s] equally to the enforcement activities of the SEC . . . under the 
Exchange Act”); Farris, supra note 57 (suggesting that the decision in Morrison “may subject 
SEC . . . enforcement actions to the Court’s new extraterritoriality test”); Nicholas I. Porritt, 
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In response to this concern, Congress directly addressed the issue in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-
Frank Act or Dodd-Frank).107 Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act108 
amends the Exchange Act to expressly provide extraterritorial jurisdiction 
for SEC actions under § 10(b), using a modified conduct and effects test.109 
Specifically, it extends U.S. jurisdiction to SEC enforcement actions where 
there was “(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs 
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct 
occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect 
within the United States.”110 While Congress did not interfere with 
Morrison as it applies to private actions, it did acknowledge the importance 
of the issue by instructing the SEC to solicit public comments and conduct a 
study111 as to whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be extended to 
private actions under § 10(b).112 
                                                                                                                                          
Supreme Court Observations: Scalia Opinion Rejects “F-Cubed” Securities Suits in Morrison, 
THE LEGAL PULSE (June 24, 2010), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2010/06/24/ihigh-court-rejects-f-
cubed-suits-in-morrison/ (noting that “the inapplicability of Section 10(b), the primary anti-fraud 
provision in the Act, is a severe loss to the [SEC] with regard to international fraud”); Gold & 
Spinogatti, supra note 104 (“In light of the Court’s rationale and its holding . . . it is difficult to 
see how the SEC would not [be] subject to the Morrison analysis.”). 
 107. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 108. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1862 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa). 
 109. See Aaron et al, supra note 102 (noting that in the Dodd-Frank Act, “Congress provides 
for U.S. jurisdiction over extraterritorial actions brought by the SEC . . . under the anti-fraud 
provisions of the US securities laws by codifying a variant of the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ test”); 
Daniel Zinn, Commentary: “Foreign-Cubed” Redux, TRADERS MAGAZINE ONLINE NEWS (Sept. 
22, 2010), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/sec-foreign-cubed-106356-1.html (“The [Dodd-
Frank] Act directly reverses the Morrison decision as it pertains to regulatory actions brought by 
the SEC.”); Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 104 (“Section 929P of Dodd-Frank specifically amends 
. . . the Exchange Act to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction for SEC . . . actions under the 
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, thus resolving any uncertainties following Morrison 
about its applicability to SEC enforcement actions.”). 
 110. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1862 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa). 
 111. The study will analyze: 
 the scope of such a private remedy, including whether it should extend to all 
private actors or should be limited to institutional investors or otherwise; 
 the implications such a right of action would have on international comity;  
 the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action for 
transnational securities frauds; and  
 whether a narrow extraterritorial standard is called for.  
BNA Sec. Law Daily, SEC Seeks Comments on Extension of Private Actions to Global Securities 
Fraud (Oct. 27, 2010). 
 112. This directive is contained in § 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act and instructs the SEC to 
report back to Congress with the results of the study within eighteen months after enactment. See 
Luke Green, Dodd-Frank: Whistleblowers, Clawbacks, and Morrison Developments, ISS:SEC. 
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Unfortunately, the situation is further complicated by the belief that the 
Dodd-Frank provision, extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to SEC 
enforcement actions, was incorrectly drafted, and is therefore, ineffective.113 
Specifically, it has been noted that “[t]he provision unambiguously 
addresses only the ‘jurisdiction’ of the ‘district courts of the United States’ 
to hear cases involving extraterritorial elements; its language does not 
expand the geographic scope of any substantive regulatory provision.” 114 In 
other words, this perceived error in the provision hinges on the Supreme 
Court’s declaration that the extraterritorial application of securities laws is 
not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.115 Congress may have 
erroneously addressed the power of the federal courts to hear a case, rather 
than the scope of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.116 As a 
result, not only have American investors lost a private right of action under 
U.S. antifraud provisions when they invest abroad, but they may have lost 
the enforcement protection of the SEC in such situations as well.117 
                                                                                                                                          
LITIG. (Nov. 2, 2010, 12:18 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2010/11/dodd-frank-
whistleblowers-clawbacks-and-morrison-developments.html. 
 113. The notion that the provision was ineffective was brought to light by George T. Conway 
III of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz who represented NAB in the Morrison litigation. See 
George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010 
/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-dodd-frank. See also Kevin LaCroix, Morrison Precludes F-
Squared Cases, Too, Court Concludes, THE D & O DIARY (July 28, 2010), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/07/articles/securities-litigation/morrison-precludes-fsquared-
cases-too-court-concludes. 
 114. See Conway, supra note 113; Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C. Hamilton, BNA World Sec. 
Law Report, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Securities Law After the Morrison Decision and 
the Dodd-Frank Act (Oct. 12, 2010) (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act did not amend the statutory text 
upon which the Supreme Court based its new ‘transactional test’ for the extraterritorial application 
of §10(b). Accordingly, an argument exists that the Dodd-Frank Act does nothing to augment the 
substantive scope of the Securities Exchange Act or overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Morrison.”). 
 115. See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of 
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 570–71 (2011). See 
also Conway, supra note 113 (“In [Morrison], the Supreme Court reiterated the longstanding 
principle that the territorial scope of a federal law does not present a question of ‘jurisdiction,’ of a 
‘tribunal’s power to hear a case,’ but rather a question of substance—of ‘what conduct’ does the 
law ‘prohibit’? The new law does not address that issue, and accordingly does not expand the 
territorial scope of the government’s enforcement powers at all.”). 
 116. See Beyea, supra note 115, at 571 (“While Congress’s intent in including this language 
was clearly to preserve the conduct and effects tests, the language of the Act as drafted does not 
actually do so.”). 
 117. Id. at 571–72 (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act may not have any effect on the application of 
Section 10(b), depending on the willingness of courts to overlook the plain language of the statute, 
even if this language is the result of a simple drafting error.”); Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham 
& Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INTL. L. 1, 19 (2011) (“[T]he SEC still might not fare well before 
some lower court judges who do not care about the intent of Congress when Congress fails to 
clearly express that intent. If the Dodd-Frank Act . . . only speaks to jurisdiction, some courts may 
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D. THE FUTURE FOR AMERICANS INVESTING OVERSEAS 
By limiting the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, “the 
Court narrows the provision’s reach to a degree that would surprise and 
alarm generations of American investors—and . . . the Congress that passed 
the Exchange Act.” 118 Domestic investors who purchase and sell securities 
traded only on foreign exchanges are no longer able to invoke U.S. 
securities laws if they suffer losses due to securities fraud.119 This is not 
insignificant, as 12.4% of securities class actions filed in the United States 
in 2009 were against foreign issuers.120 These investors, and many before 
them, relied on the robust nature of U.S. securities laws and court 
procedures to protect themselves while investing in the transnational 
marketplace.121 Going forward, however, domestic investors must consider 
alternative ways to seek redress for losses caused by securities fraud. 
Currently, because of Morrison, Americans invested overseas have no 
choice but to seek a remedy under the laws and procedures of the foreign 
countries in which their securities were purchased.122 Commencing a 
securities fraud action abroad is easier said than done, however, as “most 
[foreign countries] do not have a class action framework and may not have 
a developed body of securities law” comparable to that of the United 
States.123 The next section of this note will examine some of the securities 
class action procedures in other countries, how they compare to those in the 
                                                                                                                                          
not be willing to read into the provision what Congress clearly intended: to empower the SEC to 
bring cases where the conduct was that described in the statute.”). 
 118. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 119. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59 (“Domestic investors who purchase securities of a 
foreign issuer on a foreign exchange will no longer enjoy the ability to resort to the U.S. courts 
and legal remedies in the event that they sustain any loss due to securities fraud.”). 
 120. In 2008, 13.5% of securities class actions filed in the United States were against foreign 
issuers, and in 2007, 16.4% of securities class actions filed in the United States were against 
foreign issuers. Securities Class Action Filings—2009: A Year in Review, supra note 58, at 11. 
 121. Kevin M. LaCroix, Further Implications of Morrison v. National Bank and the Prohibition 
Against Pursuing Fraud Claims for Securities Purchased on Foreign Exchanges, CORP. & SEC. L. 
BLOG (June 28, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/corpsec/blogs/corporate 
andsecuritieslawblog/archive/2010/06/28/further-implications-of-morrison-v-national-bank-and-
the-prohibition-against-pursuing-fraud-claims-for-securities-purchased-on-foreign-exchanges.aspx 
(“As the filing levels . . . demonstrate, these investors increasingly had come to rely on the U.S. 
processes and remedies as a way to seek redress when they felt they had been misled.”); Adam T. 
Savett, Globalization in Securities Class Actions: Part 1–Non-US Investor Interest in US Suits, 
RISKMETRICS GRP. 4 (Dec. 2008) (“[T]he most robust system for investors seeking recoveries 
through securities litigation remains here in the US.”). 
 122. See Sawicki & Chatham, supra note 59 (“[I]nvestors are now left to seek redress in a 
foreign country, under the laws of the issuer’s country and possibly the laws governing the foreign 
exchange on which the shares are traded.”). 
 123. Robert Cox, Andrew Lazerow & Tonya Gaskins, The Supreme Court Slams the Door to 
U.S. Courts for F-Cubed Litigation, THE DEFENDER (Summer 2010), 
http://thedefender.howrey.com/files/FileControl/281c9044-ef01-4294-a524-ae6fc4a12a0e 
/7483b893-e478-44a4-8fed-f49aa917d8cf/Presentation/File/Defender_072210_final.pdf. See also 
Choi & Silberman, supra note 5, at 484 (stating that few other countries have a class action 
mechanism as robust as that found in the United States). 
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United States, and whether, because of Morrison, American investors are 
left without adequate protection against foreign corporate fraud. 
III. SEEKING REDRESS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD OVERSEAS 
Class actions,124 such as the one brought in Morrison, overcome 
collective action problems in situations where many individuals or entities 
are injured by the conduct of another by “providing an effective and 
inexpensive procedure for joining large numbers of individual plaintiffs.”125 
Class actions provide access to justice,126 and have “enormous potential to 
deter institutional and corporate wrongdoing and to shift the balance of 
power” between individual plaintiffs and powerful corporations.127 While 
class actions are commonplace in the United States, several countries do not 
have any kind of group litigation procedure.128 Without such an option, 
small injuries to many individual investors go unremedied since the injured 
are unlikely to be able to incur the cost of litigation alone.129 As such, the 
presence of some type of claim aggregation procedure is thought to be vital 
to the rights of investors.130 While it is true that several countries have 
adopted some form of group litigation procedure,131 many of these countries 
advance various measures, not found in the United States, that present 
                                                                                                                                          
 124. A class action is a civil lawsuit brought by a private actor on behalf of a large number of 
similarly situated, but absent, parties. Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An 
Overview, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 7, 13 (Deborah Hensler, Christopher Hodges & Magdalena Tulibacka eds. 2009). 
 125. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 914–15 (2005) (explaining that class actions overcome the difficulties 
caused by bringing litigants together using traditional joinder and intervention procedures, which 
are costly and organizationally difficult). See also Yves Heijmans, Class Actions in Belgium and 
Europe, 24 No.3 ACC DOCKET 117 (Mar. 2006) (“Class actions are seen as an effective way to 
facilitate damages actions by spreading the costs and risks of individual litigation. This can be 
particularly useful when a large number of persons have suffered a small individual loss.”); 
Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 23 Amendments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102–03 (1966) (noting that 
class actions may “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of 
decision as to persons similarly situated”). 
 126. RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A 
COMPARITIVE PERSPECTIVE 52–54 (2004) (noting that class actions provide “substantive law with 
teeth,” allow injured parties to overcome cost-related barriers, and balance an adversarial structure 
where defendants usually enjoy the upper hand in small scale individual litigation). 
 127. Hensler, supra note 124, at 9. 
 128. See Cox, Lazerow & Gaskins, supra note 123. 
 129. See EISENBERG, supra note 125, at 915. 
 130. In the forum non conveniens context, some courts have held that lack of both claim 
aggregation and opt-out procedures “do not afford a meaningful remedy to class action plaintiffs” 
and have rendered such jurisdictions inadequate to hear a claim. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 
37. 
 131. Countries that have some sort of representative class action mechanism include “Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden[,] and United Kingdom (England and Wales).” John J. Clarke, Jr. & 
Keara M. Gordon, Global Realm of Securities Class Actions, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 2008, at S4. 
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significant obstacles to plaintiffs pursuing a group action for securities 
fraud.132 
A. LITIGATION FUNDING MEASURES 
One of the major obstacles to bringing litigation abroad is the way 
litigation is commonly funded outside the United States. Contingency fee 
agreements are permitted in the United States, whereby plaintiffs’ attorneys 
fund litigation and then receive a percentage of any class settlement or 
judgment.133 If the plaintiff class is unsuccessful, however, class counsel 
gets nothing and absorbs the litigation expenses.134 Thus, contingency 
agreements shift the entire financial risk of class action litigation from the 
class to class counsel.135 As a result, lawyers are incentivized to vigorously 
pursue meritorious class actions since nothing will be recovered if the 
litigation is unsuccessful.136 Countries that prohibit contingency fees—
including Australia,137 England,138 Germany,139 India,140 Japan, 141 and the 
                                                                                                                                          
 132. See infra Part III.A–D.  
 133. See MULHERON, supra note 126, at 469. 
 134. See Hensler, supra note 124, at 23. 
 135. See MULHERON, supra note 126, at 468. 
 136. See Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Chen Jian-Lin, Reforming China’s Securities Civil 
Actions: Lessons from PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit 
Enforcement in Taiwan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 115, 134 (2008) (“Contingency fees provide 
incentives for lawyers to organize and pursue class actions, and indeed, in the U.S., class actions 
are often lawyer-initiated and lawyer-driven.”); Mike Myers, Benefits of the Contingent-Fee 
Agreement, CONTINGENT FEE BUS. LITIG. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2008, 11:13 AM), http://www.con 
tingentfeeblog.com/2008/08/articles/contingent-fee-representation/benefits-of-the-contingentfee-
agreement/. 
 137. Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131 (noting that contingent fee agreements are prohibited in 
Australia but ‘no win, no fee’ arrangements are permitted). In a “no win, no fee” or “conditional 
fee” arrangement, if successful, plaintiffs’ counsel receives “a time-based rate, increased by a 
multiplication factor” or uplift that is “typically not tied to a percentage of the award[].” 
Mallesons Stephen Jaques, Corporate Class Actions in Australia (June 2006), 
http://www.mallesons.com/publications/2006/Jun/8472865W.htm; Stefano M. Grace, 
Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: U.S. - Style Securities Class Actions and the Acquis 
Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 281, 287 (2006). The “no win, no fee” 
arrangement, however, decreases the incentive for lawyers to bring class actions. See Hensler, 
supra note 124, at 24. Additionally, a litigation funding system has emerged in Australia where a 
company may enter an agreement with a plaintiff to fund the litigation in return for an agreed 
upon percentage of any received award. The company then has “broad discretion to conduct the 
litigation as [it] see[s] fit.” S. Stuart Clark, Thinking Locally, Suing Globally: The International 
Frontiers of Mass Tort Litigation in Australia, 74 DEF. COUNSEL J. 139, 141 (2007). 
 138. See Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131. England, however, does permit “conditional fee” 
arrangements. Heather Smith, Is America Exporting Class Actions to Europe?, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER (Feb. 28, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1141047298349. 
 139. See Grace, supra note 137, at 300. 
 140. See V. Umakanth, Shareholder Activism and Class Action Lawsuits, INDIAN CORP. LAW 
BLOG (June 1, 2009, 7:41 AM), http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.com/2009/06/shareholder-activism-
and-class-action.html. 
 141. See Mark A. Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global Litigation Trends, 17 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 185 (2008–2009). Japan does “permit a success fee, allowing plaintiffs’ 
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Netherlands142—essentially prevent access to justice for claimants who are 
unable to afford attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs up front.143 
Additionally, in the United States, regardless of the outcome, each party 
is responsible for paying its own litigation fees and expenses.144 This is 
significant, as the class representative is protected from the financial risk of 
having to pay the defendant’s costs in the event of a loss.145 The “American 
rule,” as it is known,146 is “considered an important measure in removing 
the barriers to class proceedings.”147 In contrast, under the “English rule” of 
fee shifting, the losing party pays the costs of the prevailing party.148 The 
“loser pays” rule is a significant disincentive to bringing class action 
litigation due to the high risk for the representative plaintiff of liability for 
all of the defendant’s costs if the defendant prevails.149 A number of 
countries—including Argentina,150 Australia,151 Canada,152 China,153 
England,154 Germany,155 the Netherlands,156 and Sweden157—utilize the 
“English rule” of fee shifting, where “large cost awards against 
unsuccessful plaintiffs . . . have a chilling effect and [are] likely [to] 
discourage meritorious class actions.”158 
The absence of contingency fee agreements and the risks associated 
with “loser pays” rules deter the initiation of class actions, as representative 
plaintiffs are unlikely to emerge to represent a class if they must bear the 
entire cost of litigation and risk having to pay the costs of the defendant.159 
Maintenance of legal funding rules such as these “do[es] not . . . 
accommodate the realities of representative litigation”160 and presents a 
                                                                                                                                          
attorneys to be paid a customary hourly rate, regardless of the outcome, as well as an additional 
payment if the client wins.” Id. 
 142. See Grace, supra note 137, at 296. 
 143. Id. at 288.  
 144. Hensler, supra note 124, at 22. 
 145. MULHERON, supra note 126, at 436. 
 146. Id. at 436 n.3.  
 147. Id. at 436 (internal quotations omitted).  
 148. See MULHERON, supra note 126, at 436–37. 
 149. See Grace, supra note 137, at 290.  
 150. See Héctor A. Mairal, Argentina, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 622 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 54, 55 (2009). In exceptional cases, however, the court 
may order each party to pay their own legal fees if “the controversy [is] sufficiently complex to 
justify the decision of the loser to litigate.” Id. 
 151. See Clark, supra note 137, at 148. 
 152. See Jasminka Kalajdzic, Canada, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS, 622 
ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 45 (2009). 
 153. Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 128. 
 154. See Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131. 
 155. See Grace, supra note 137, at 300. 
 156. See id. at 296.  
 157. See id. at 295.  
 158. Kalajdzic, supra note 152, at 45. 
 159. Hensler, supra note 124, at 23. 
 160. Id. at 7.  
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significant obstacle to injured parties pursuing private enforcement in many 
foreign countries.161 
B. OPT-OUT VERSUS OPT-IN PROCEDURES 
Another mechanism which may hamper the ability of investors to 
recover for securities fraud involves the procedure by which investors 
become part of a class action. Under the opt-out class action regime, which 
is found in the United States, class members are automatically part of the 
class, unless they specifically exclude themselves from the litigation within 
a certain timeframe.162 If a class member does not opt-out, he is bound by 
the outcome of the case and shares in any settlement or award.163 An opt-
out provision is beneficial to investors for a number of reasons: (1) it avoids 
the possibility of a class member effectively losing his rights simply 
because he forgot to affirmatively request class membership; (2) it 
“enhances access to legal remedies for those who are disadvantaged . . . 
[and] would be unable for one reason or another to take the positive step of 
including themselves in the proceedings”; and (3) it ensures that defendants 
are held liable for all losses, rather than avoiding responsibility because 
some injured investors failed to opt-in to the class.164 The opt-out procedure 
ultimately guarantees the inclusion of individuals who might be unable to 
bring their own action due to cost or lack of resources.165 
The opt-in procedure, on the other hand, requires that those, who wish 
to be part of an investor class action, take steps to include themselves in the 
litigation.166 As such, only claimants who affirmatively opt-in are class 
members who will share in any award or settlement.167 In countries such as 
China,168 England,169 Germany,170 and Sweden,171 which utilize the opt-in 
                                                                                                                                          
 161. Grace, supra note 137, at 287–90. An additional type of funding has emerged, known as 
“no win/no pay” or a “conditional fee,” in which attorneys will fund litigation but the attorneys’ 
fees “may not be a percentage of damages obtained.” Attorneys may only recover their hourly 
charges and expenses plus a limited premium (or “up-lift”). Hensler, supra note 124, at 22; Grace, 
supra note 137, at 287. 
 162. MULHERON, supra note 126, at 34 (explaining that the opt-out model binds people “as 
members of the class unless they take an affirmative step to indicate that they wish to be excluded 
from the action and from the effect of the judgment” and “allows a class action to be commenced 
by the representative plaintiff without . . . the express consent of the class members”). 
 163. Hensler, supra note 124, at 15. Those that do opt-out of the litigation exclude themselves 
from any class settlement or award and may bring an individual claim against the defendant. Id. 
 164. MULHERON, supra note 126, at 35–38. The opt-out procedure also promotes the interests 
of economy, consistency, and finality by avoiding multiple cases, avoiding different outcomes, 
and resolving all similar claims against the defendant. See Grace, supra note 137, at 289. 
 165. Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 133. 
 166. Hensler, supra note 124, at 15–16. 
 167. Id. at 16.  
 168. See Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 129–30. 
 169. See Behrens, Fowler & Kim, supra note 141, at 175. 
 170. See Grace, supra note 137, at 299. 
 171. See id. at 294–95.  
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procedure, potential claimants are at risk of losing the benefits of 
participating in a class action if they are unaware of the class proceeding or 
are otherwise unable to opt-in.172 
C. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY 
The securities laws in other countries, and especially the requirements 
related to proving the elements of securities fraud, may also prove 
challenging for U.S. investors bringing suit abroad. The United States has 
adopted the fraud on the market theory, whereby in securities fraud actions, 
a plaintiff is presumed to have relied on the defendant’s material 
misstatements by trading in the defendant’s stock in an efficient market at a 
price which reflected the defendant’s fraud.173 In other words, in securities 
class actions in the United States, individual proof of reliance on the 
defendant’s fraudulent statements is not required.174 In contrast to the 
United States, “most jurisdictions have not adopted the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine,”175 including, Australia,176 England,177 France,178 Germany,179 
New Zealand,180 and Singapore.181 Thus, in securities class actions in these 
and other countries, each plaintiff must individually prove reliance on the 
defendant’s misstatements, which, in a class action, is nearly impossible 
                                                                                                                                          
 172. Hensler, supra note 124, at 16. 
 173. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 247 (1988) (“[A]n investor [in U.S. markets] 
who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that 
price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s 
reliance on any public material representations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 
10b-5 action.”). 
 174. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 36. 
 175. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors and Students of the Yale Law School Capital 
Markets and Financial Instruments Clinic in Support of Respondents, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 748251 at *4.  
 176. See Eilís Ferran, Are US-Style Investor Suits Coming to the U.K.?, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 
315, 336 (Oct. 2009) (noting that the “[f]raud on the market theory has not been adopted in 
Australia”); Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131 (noting that in Australia, “the availability of the 
‘fraud on the market’ presumption of reliance remains an open question”). 
 177. See Ferran, supra note 176, at 327 (noting that the fraud on the market presumption of 
reliance, developed in the United States, has not been adopted in the U.K.). 
 178. See Hubert de Vauplane & Odile Simart, The Concept of Securities Manipulation and its 
Foundations in France and the USA, 23 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 203, 218 (1997) (noting that the 
fraud on the market doctrine has not been incorporated in France). 
 179. See Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? 
Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 71 n.89 (2005) 
(commenting that individual reliance must be shown under German securities law, in contrast to 
the fraud on the market theory in the United States). 
 180. See Boyd Knight v. Purdue, [1999] 2 NZLR 278, Lexis 406, at 42–43 (CA Wellington) 
(rejecting the fraud on the market theory as contrary to the purpose of the New Zealand Securities 
Act of 1978). 
 181. See Hans Tjio, Enforcing Corporate Disclosure, 2009 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 332, 349 
(2009) (noting that, like the U.K., Singapore has not adopted the fraud on the market theory). 
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due to high costs and inherent collective action problems.182 The lack of 
recognition of the fraud on the market theory is an additional significant 
hurdle which severely limits the opportunity for recovery by plaintiffs in 
securities class actions abroad.183 
D. OTHER LIMITATIONS 
In addition to the aforementioned limitations, individual countries may 
also maintain various procedures and rules, which further restrict the 
successful implementation of securities class actions. For example, in order 
to bring a civil action in China, it must be based on an existing 
administrative sanction or criminal judgment against the defendant.184 As a 
result, if no action has been taken against a defendant by a governmental 
body, claimants have no recourse.185 In securities class actions in Israel, 
investors must “convince the judge that they have a likelihood of 
prevailing” in order to proceed.186 This provision gives judges significant 
power in deciding whether a securities class action moves forward.187 In 
South Korea, securities class actions are only permitted by a minimum of 
fifty class members who collectively own at least .01 percent of the 
defendant’s equity.188 This minimum shareholding requirement “undercuts . 
. . class action law” by imposing a considerable barrier to securities class 
actions against the largest companies.189 Finally, in Ontario, where most 
Canadian securities class actions are brought,190 damages in securities class 
actions are capped at the greater of $1 million or 5 percent of the market 
capitalization of the issuer.191 Damage caps are a setback for plaintiffs who 
have suffered far greater damages than what is recoverable and will likely 
                                                                                                                                          
 182. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 44 (commenting that requiring individual proof by each 
plaintiff in a class action “would be procedurally impossible”); Tjio, supra note 181, at 349 
(“[I]nvestor actions against issuers are severely hampered by the lack of a fraud on the market 
theory, which militates against any actions by most investors due to the costs of securities 
litigation and collective action problems.”). 
 183. See Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 184. See Wang & Jian-Lin, supra note 136, at 124–25. 
 185. See id. at 125 (explaining that investors cannot bring a cause of action if there is no 
administrative sanction or criminal judgment against the defendant, “even if regulatory authorities 
or prosecutors have detected securities fraud but, out of policy considerations, have chosen not to 
take action”).  
 186. Gary L. Gassman & Perry S. Granof, Global Issues Affecting Securities Claims at the 
Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85, 101 (Fall 2007) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 103.  
 189. Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1522 
(Oct. 2004). For example, the Korean company, Samsung, has a market capitalization of $39.1 
billion. In order for claimants to bring a securities class action against Samsung, they would have 
to collectively own $3.91 million in equity, which would be extremely difficult to meet. Id. 
 190. Gassman & Granof, supra note 186, at 88. 
 191. Clarke & Gordon, supra note 131. 
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deter American investors from commencing securities class actions 
Canada.192 
These various mechanisms—in addition to the prohibitions on 
contingency fees, prevalence of “loser pays” rules, opt-in procedures, and 
non-recognition of the fraud on the market theory—serve as barriers to 
securities class action litigation abroad,193 making investor suits impractical 
and relatively rare outside of the United States.194 After Morrison, since 
Americans investing overseas have no choice but to turn to these “toothless 
investor protection schemes abroad,” such investors are significantly 
disadvantaged and lack sufficient protection from foreign corporate 
fraud.195 
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD LEGISLATE TO MITIGATE THE 
EFFECTS OF MORRISON 
Congress should legislate to mitigate the harmful effects of Morrison 
and restore the applicability of the antifraud provisions to Americans 
investing outside the United States. Doing so would be consistent with the 
purpose and intent of the Exchange Act196 and serve the interests of 
increased global market integrity and investor confidence.197 
The Congress of the 1930s could not have anticipated the extent to 
which securities markets, business transactions, and national economies 
would become globally interconnected.198 Therefore, the fact that Congress 
did not explicitly address the issue of the extraterritorial application of  
§ 10(b) is not unreasonable. Despite the lack of an explicit jurisdictional 
statement, some scholars share the view that Congress “expected U.S. 
securities laws to apply to certain international transactions or conduct.”199 
Additionally, the antifraud provisions are recognized as being somewhat 
                                                                                                                                          
 192. Emily C. Cole, Recent Developments in Canadian Securities Class-Action Law, 20:4 
A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. J. 13, 16 (2010), available at http://www.millerthomson.com/assets 
/files/article_attachments/Emily_C_Cole_Recent_Developments_in_Canadian_Securities_Class-
Action_Law.pdf. 
 193. See Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor 
Protection, 41 INT’L LAW 1121, 1143–44 (2007). 
 194. See id. at 1121.  
 195. See id. at 1129 (stating that outside the United States, “it is nearly impossible for investors 
to seek redress for losses caused by fraud”).  
 196. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657–59 (1997). 
 197. See Thompson, supra note 193, at 1144 (arguing that increased investor protection is 
necessary due to the globalization of securities markets). 
 198. Kahn, supra note 1, at 369–70 (noting that it is unsurprising that Congress did not provide 
for the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) because “the Congress that enacted the securities 
laws could not have anticipated the future globalization of the American economy”). 
 199. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 19. See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 
468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972) (detailing evidence that Congress “meant § 10(b) to protect 
against fraud in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized 
United States markets”). 
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obscure,200 to the point that the Supreme Court itself has stated that there is 
“judicial authority to shape . . . the 10b-5 cause of action.”201 It is with these 
considerations in mind, that the Second Circuit sought to understand what 
Congress would have wanted with respect to the extraterritorial application 
of securities laws, given today’s transnational marketplace.202 Looking to 
the congressional history of the Exchange Act, protection of American 
investors is the focus of § 10(b).203 The intent behind § 10(b) was “to 
remedy deceptive and manipulative conduct with the potential to harm the 
public interest or the interest of investors.”204 This goal of investor 
protection is clear in the congressional record: “[t]he 1934 Act was 
designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices.”205 This 
is a compelling justification for Congress to legislate to protect those 
American investors who are barred from U.S. courts by Morrison. For 
nearly forty years, the lower courts cited the abovementioned justifications 
in applying the “conduct” and/or “effects” tests to determine the 
extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions.206 In that time, Congress 
could have legislated to modify the approach outlined by the Second Circuit 
if it was overly broad or unfaithful to the purpose of the Exchange Act.207 
Notably, Congress did not act. 
The policy considerations underlying the Exchange Act—encouraging 
investor confidence and protecting the integrity of the securities 
markets208—require the extension of U.S. securities laws to fraudulent 
conduct affecting American investors in the global securities market.209 
                                                                                                                                          
 200. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
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transnational securities frauds fall within the statute’s compass.”). 
 201. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 293 (1993). 
 202. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d. Cir. 1975) (stating that when 
“a court is confronted with transactions that . . . are predominantly foreign, it must seek to 
determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts 
and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign 
countries”). 
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(1934)). 
 206. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the approach used 
by the Second Circuit has been the law “for nearly four decades”). 
 207. See id. at 2891 (“The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress’ 
failure to reject [its] reasonable interpretation of the wording of § 10(b) . . . argues significantly in 
favor of acceptance of the [Second Circuit] rule by this Court.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 208. See U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657–59 (1997). 
 209. See Thompson, supra note 193, at 1127 (“Globalization of the securities markets . . . 
means that one act of securities fraud will cause investor losses around the globe. Therefore, 
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Without the availability of “the most comprehensive securities regulation 
scheme in the world”210 to adequately deter and compensate for foreign 
corporate misconduct, Americans will be reluctant to invest, leading to 
instability in U.S. markets and further adverse effects on investor 
confidence.211 
In order to adequately safeguard American investors and markets and 
provide a remedy for fraudulent conduct occurring abroad, in conformity 
with the purpose and intent of the Exchange Act, I propose that Congress 
legislate on the issue and adopt a modified “effects” test in conjunction with 
a “reasonability” inquiry. Such an approach will return robust investor 
protection measures to Americans investing in securities abroad, balance 
issues of international comity and fairness, and hopefully spur the 
development of stronger investor protections and complementary group 
litigation procedures overseas. 
Under the first part of my suggested approach, the modified effects test, 
the reach of U.S. antifraud provisions is presumed to extend to any 
securities-related fraud which has an adverse effect on investors or related 
interests within the United States, no matter where the securities were 
purchased or where the fraudulent conduct actually occurred. Thus, any 
American investor who suffers a loss in a foreign-traded stock due to 
fraudulent conduct by a foreign issuer is presumptively protected by  
§ 10(b), as is a holder of related securities, such as ADRs and options. A 
significant number of investors need not be affected in order for American 
plaintiffs to have a Rule 10b-5 cause of action under this part of the test, 
and neither would a minimum amount of losses be required. Nevertheless, 
similar to the “effects” test articulated by the Second Circuit, general claims 
of an adverse effect on American economic interests would be insufficient 
to meet this test, as they are too speculative. 
The aforementioned presumption would be rebuttable, however, in the 
second part of my suggested approach, which is an inquiry as to the 
reasonableness of extending U.S. antifraud provisions to reach the specific 
situation in question.212 This analysis would take into account certain 
factors, such as the nationalities of the parties, the amount of losses suffered 
by the claimants, whether there is a private right of action for securities 
fraud in the issuer’s home country, whether there is a group litigation 
                                                                                                                                          
securities fraud committed by multinational companies listing on international exchanges will 
impact the whole world’s capital markets, causing market instability on a global scale.”); 
Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 22 (explaining that countries have an interest in protecting their own 
citizens and markets from fraudulent activity occurring abroad). 
 210. See Thompson, supra note 193, at 1121 (stating that “the United States has the most 
comprehensive securities regulation scheme in the world”). 
 211. See id. at 1126 (“[T]he United States should strengthen investor protections, not weaken 
them leaving investors more vulnerable to risk and making U.S. financial markets less stable.”).  
 212. This “reasonability” inquiry is loosely based on section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987). 
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mechanism in the issuer’s home country, and whether the procedures 
related to bringing group litigation in the issuer’s home country are 
prohibitive, to determine the reasonableness of extending U.S. securities 
laws to reach foreign issuers. Thus, it would likely be unreasonable to 
extend the reach of U.S. antifraud provisions to situations where the loss 
suffered by the plaintiffs is very small, the issuer’s home country allows a 
private right of action for securities fraud, some type of group litigation 
procedure exists there, and the procedures are not overly discouraging of 
investor group actions. For example, if the issuer’s home country was 
Canada, which permits class actions in Ontario, recognizes a private right of 
action to recover damages based on false or misleading statements in 
secondary market disclosures, allows contingency fees, presumes reliance 
once misrepresentation is established, and the losses to the American 
plaintiffs were relatively small, even though a “loser pays” system is 
utilized and there are caps on damages, it would likely be reasonable for the 
American plaintiffs to bring their action in Canada, and thus, the 
presumption of the application of U.S. antifraud provisions would be 
rebutted. 
This combined approach mitigates the harmful effects of Morrison on 
Americans investing abroad and presumes that injured American investors 
have a Rule 10b-5 cause of action in the United States, unless the claimants 
are likely to be as successful in bringing a similar claim in the issuer’s 
home country. Thus, American investors are sufficiently protected from 
fraudulent conduct regardless of where the securities are traded, and issues 
of international comity and fairness are taken into consideration as well. 
Under this approach, it is hoped that foreign jurisdictions, realizing that 
U.S. securities laws will control much of the time when Americans invest 
abroad, will be persuaded to take steps to strengthen their antifraud 
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